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LAY PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
ENHANCING JUSTICE SYSTEM LEGITIMACY IN 
POST-CONFLICT STATES 
EMILIE T AMANt 
ABSTRACT 
In the aftermath of de-stabilizing coriflicts, the transition to sustainable 
democracy is a challenging one. Open and transparent decision-making 
processes which encourage lay participation are important to this 
transition. With few remaining fimctional institutions, Governments 
must undergo reform at eve1y level in order to effectively promote and 
enforce the Rule of Law. Criminal justice reform, in particular, is 
essential. This paper will examine lay participation in criminaljustice 
and the role it can play in building legitimate criminal justice instUu-
tions. The Canadian common law jwy will be examined as one model 
and the French, civilian-style 'lay assessor' model as another. These 
two models will then form the basis of an analysis of post-Apartheid 
South Africa and post-genocide Rwanda. It will be argued that while the 
jury system is effective in common law countries with legal infrastruc-
tures which support it, it may not be the most appropriate form of lay 
participation for deeply fractionalized societies. Indeed, in both the 
South African and Rwandan example it will be shown that lay assessors 
are best suited to the promotion of legitimate criminal justice institu-
tions in these States. 
t Emilie Taman is a second year law student at Dalhousie University. Special thanks to 
Professor Bruce Archibald for his guidance and support in the writing of this paper. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The transition from an oppressive regime to participatory democracy is 
often seen as the triumphant end to years of struggle and instability. 
However, effecting the change in political leadership is only one small 
step on the path to sustainable democracy. The long-term success of any 
new democracy will only be feasible where there are strong institutions 
which are capable of maintaining social order. This must occur not only 
through the provision of education and health-related services, but 
through the promotion and enforcement of the Rule of Law. Criminal 
justice reform, in particular, is essential. Indeed, as Chris Mburu stated 
at the World Bank Conference on Empowerment, Security and Opp01tu-
nity Through Law and Justice: 
Successful legal and judicial reforms depend largely on the existence 
of an institutional infrastructure that permits the coordination of 
projects by the different government entities involved in the adminis-
tration of justice. In post-conflict situations, this infrastructure is 
largely lacking because the conflict usually leads to the demise of most 
institutions that symbolize the existence of a functioning state. To 
commence on a program of judicial or legal reform in such situations, 
it becomes necessary to try and reconstruct these institutions. 1 
Those responsible for instituting refonn proposals are left with a daunt-
ing task. However, the complete rebuilding of legal institutions provides 
reformists with an opportunity to implement infrastructures which will 
be the most conducive to long-term legitimacy. A key element to the 
promotion of this institutional legitimacy is lay participation in criminal 
justice adjudication. 
This paper is primarily concerned with two models of lay participa-
tion and what, if anything, they have to offer to the promotion of 
legitimate criminal justice institutions in post-conflict societies: the jury 
system and the use of lay assessors. There are variations on each of these 
systems. For the sake of clarity, the Anglo-American model will be 
1 Chris Mburu, "Challenges Facing Legal and Judicial Reform in Post-Conflict Environments: 
Case Study from Rwanda and Sierra Leone" (2001) (Paper presented to the World Bank 
Conference on Empowerment, Security and Opportunity Through Law and Justice, July 2001) 
at 13 [unpublished, on-line: The World Bank Group <www.worldbank.org/legal/ljr_Ol/doc/ 
mburu.pdt>] [Mburu, "Challenges"]. 
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examined as a template for the jury and the French system will be 
examined as one of many ways in which lay assessors can be used. At 
this point, it is important to note that the terminology used in the 
literature on this subject is inconsistent. Often, jurisdictions which 
employ a mixed bench of lay assessors and professional judges use the 
language of "jury" to connote the lay participants. In order to make the 
distinction clear, where the system does not involve an English-style 
jury, the term assessor will be used in this paper. 
It will be argued that while the jury system works in common law 
countries with legal infrastructures that support it, it may not be the most 
appropriate form of lay participation for deeply fractionalized societies. 
However, it will be shown through an examination of South Africa in its 
transition to full pmiicipatory democracy, that the use of lay assessors 
should be promoted as a means of bringing legitimacy to criminal 
justice systems in post-conflict states. Further, Rwanda will be consid-
ered to demonstrate the extent to which lay participation has been 
encouraged in that country through the traditional gacaca comis which 
are used in the place of conventional trials to deal with people accused 
of genocide-related crimes. 
II. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION: THE JURY IN CANADA 
The jwy injects a democratic element into the law. This element is 
vital to the effective administration of criminal justice, not only in 
safeguarding the rights of the accused, but in encouraging popular 
acceptance of the laws and the necessmy general acquiescence in 
their application ... Martyrdom does not come easily to a man who has 
been found guilty as charged by twelve of his neighbours and fellow 
citizens. 
Black J., dissenting in Green v. United States2 
The symbolic fzmction of the jury far outweighs its practical signifi-
cance ... Adulation of the jury is based on no justification or spurious 
justification ... The jury is an anti-democratic, irrational and haphaz-
2 356 U.S. 165 (1958) at 215-16 [Green] [emphasis added]. 
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ard legislator whose erratic and secret decisions run counter to the 
rule of law. 
- Penny Darbyshire3 
These statements are evocative of the important role that the jury has 
played in the Anglo-American tradition. Even Darbyshire's comment 
which is clearly anti-jury, recognizes the symbolic significance of the 
institution. This symbolism must not be underestimated as it promotes a 
sense of connectedness of the general public to the criminal justice 
process, infusing it with an important democratic element. However, it 
will be seen that this "injection of a democratic element into the law"4 is 
not exclusive to the institution of the jury per se but rather may be 
achieved through alternative forms of lay participation. 
1. A Brief History of the Jury at Common Law 
Lay participation in criminal justice has been an entrenched feature of 
common law criminal justice processes for centuries. Indeed, it is be-
lieved to have been introduced in England with the Norman Conquest of 
1066.5 The role and composition of the jury underwent many incarna-
tions in its early years but by 1215, the jury of twelve, as we know it 
today, was the standard body of lay adjudicators, charged with the task 
of making findings of guilt. 6 Initially, the jury played a different role in 
the criminal justice process than it does today. In order to bring a much 
needed local perspective, men from the community were asked to 
participate in criminal adjudication. The purpose of this participation 
was to include in the process people with particular knowledge of local 
morals and custom who were likely to have first hand knowledge of the 
events in question. In this respect, jurors performed a dual function: they 
were responsible for both providing testimonial accounts as witnesses 
3 Penny Darbyshire, "The Lamp That Shows That Freedom Lives - ls it Worth the Candle?" 
(1991) Crim. L. Rev. 741 at 750 [emphasis added]. 
4 Green, supra note 2. 
5 Ellison Kahn, "Restore the Jury? Or 'Reform? Reform? Aren't Things Bad Enough Al-
ready?' I" (1991) 108 S.A.L.J. 672 at 676 [Kahn, "Restore or Reform"]. 
6 Ibid. 
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and for assisting with the making of ultimate factual conclusions. 7 This 
was particularly true in the days before the emergence of the common 
law doctrine of stare decisis. 8 Rather than look to a comprehensive body 
of law for legal application of factual findings, the early jury partici-
pated with a view to ensuring that local justice was achieved: "its 
structures looked to the society itself for the means and justification of 
dispute resolution."9 
By the 17th century, the jury was beginning to take its modern form. 
The transition was made from judicial reliance on jurors for their 
particular, local knowledge of the matter at issue to reliance by judges 
"on !jurors'] impartial, collective and unanimous response to evidence 
the existence of which they had been unaware."1° Furthermore, juries 
were not educated in the law and relied on judges to articulate it to them, 
particularly as a body of substantive law grew through the doctrine of 
stare decisis and, ultimately, codification. These additions were not the 
result of widespread political change but rather part of a gradual institu-
tional reform that helped keep the jury relevant as the underlying 
institutional structure was gradually transformed over time. 
Today, the jury is a feature of many adversarial systems and enjoys 
significant institutional legitimacy, largely as the result of its long 
common law history. In fact, several countries now have constitution-
ally entrenched rights to trial by jury in criminal matters. In Canada, for 
example, the right to trial by jury is articulated ins. 1 l(f) of the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms: 11 
11 Proceedings in criminal and penal matters Any person charged 
with an offence has the right 
(f) except in the case of an offence under military law tried before a 
military tribunal, to the benefit of trial by jury where the maximum 
punishment for the offence is imprisonment for five years or a more 
severe punishment. 
7 H. Patrick Glenn, "The Common Law in Canada" (1995) 74 Can. Bar Rev. 261 at 263. 
8 Ibid. at 264. 
9 Ibid. at 263. 
1° Kahn, "Restore or Reform", supra note 5. 
11 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, 
c.11 [Charter]. 
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Furthermore, Canadian laws of evidence, both at common law and as 
codified in the Criminal Code, reflect the fact that lay jurors will often 
be employed to make findings of fact. The common law rules of hearsay 
and exclusionary rules relating to character evidence, for example, were 
partly developed in response to the need not to confuse juries with 
factual matters which were too disconnected to the material legal ques-
tions at issue. More generally, the underlying structures of the 
adversarial system complement the use of lay juries in a way which the 
civil inquisitorial system does not. 
However, this is not to say that the jury system is without its 
problems. In Canada, and the United States for example, while the jury 
system forms part of a democratic framework which provides institu-
tional safeguards for potential injustices that may result, it is nonethe-
less arguable that its long history overshadows potential problems with 
the reliance on jurors in criminal prosecutions. 
2. Current Problems with the Jury System in Canada 
Despite the fact that the jury allows for lay participation in criminal 
justice, it has been argued that juries are becoming increasingly unable 
to deal with the problems of contemporary society. 12 Those who argue 
against the introduction of juries in post-conflict states, for example, 
argue that the jury system is appropriate only in homogeneous societ-
ies.13 Canada is an example of an ethnically diverse and linguistically 
pluralized society in which the jury has been able to survive despite the 
obvious lack of social homogeneity. 
However, can it really be said that juries are effectively meeting the 
needs of minorities in Canada? Considering the fact that jury trials are 
far less common than they used to be and that the reality of population 
growth and diversity highlight that juries tend not to be truly representa-
tive of one's peers, is trial by jury still relevant in this context? 
12 See e.g. John H. Langbein, "On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The Disappearanee of 
Criminal Jury Trial" ( 1992) 15 Harv. J .L. & Pub. Pol 'y 119 [Langbein, "The Myth"], and "The 
Case for Blaek Juries", Note (1969-1970) 79 Yale L..T. 531 ["Black Juries"]. 
13 See e.g. Mashall S. Huebner, "Who Decides? Restructuring Criminal Justice for a Demo-
cratic South Africa" (1992-1993) 102 Yale L.J. 961 [Huebner, "Who Decides"]. 
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i. The Decline of the Jury 
The first problem is not really a problem with the jury system per se but 
rather with the fact that the use of juries is on the decline. As one 
American author put it: "Although the [Constitution] mandates jury 
trials for 'all' criminal cases, the reality is far different. In place of 'all,' 
a more accurate term to describe the use of jury trial in the discharge of 
our criminal caseload would be 'virtually none. "' 14 While the effects of 
bypassing trials by jury are beyond the scope of this effort, it is certainly 
an important trend to note. In particular, as criminal justice systems face 
increasing pressures to deal with mounting case loads, many accused 
people are induced to plead guilty in exchange for deals from the 
prosecution. As this becomes an increasingly common way of dealing 
with overburdened criminal justice systems, lay pmiicipation in crimi-
nal justice will be significantly reduced, leading to concerns that the 
legitimacy of the system may be compromised over time. 
ii. The Jury as a Cross-Section of Society 
Another problem is that while an underlying premise of the use of juries 
is to ensure that an accused is judged by his or her peers, individuals 
accused of crimes will often find themselves before juries whose social 
realities may be quite different from their own. In the United States, for 
example, juries tend to be comprised of largely white, middle-class 
citizens. 15 Black Americans, who are hugely over-represented in the 
prison population, are under-represented on juries. 16 This imbalance has 
the effect of not only undermining the legitimacy of a given proceeding 
for an individual black accused, for example, but of undermining the 
institution of the jury to the black community at large. 17 This challenge 
to the institutional legitimacy of the jury may, over time, contribute to 
lack of confidence in the wider criminal justice process for that commu-
nity. 
14 Langbein, "The Myth", supra note 12 at 120. 
15 "Black Juries", supra note 12 at 532. 
16 "Black Juries", supra note 12 at 534. 
17 "Black Juries", supra note 12 at 534. 
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However, the strength of legal institutions in the United States and 
Canada has the effect of providing an institutional means through which 
the effects of such problems may be mitigated against and thus public 
confidence in the system remains largely unharmed. In particular, due to 
the constitutional entrenchment of trial by jury and of legal equality in 
Canada 18 there remains a right to challenge the validity of a jury verdict 
where the jury selection process offends either of these constitutional 
rights. Where a jury that is literally representative does not result, it is 
thought that the institutionalized random selection process nonetheless 
ensures trial faimess. 19 
In Canada, this problem has been encountered largely in the context 
of aboriginal peoples charged with criminal offences. In R v. Yooya,20 for 
example, the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench looked at the scope 
of the right to be tried by a jury of one's peers. In that case, the accused 
sought to be tried before a jury selected from among individuals who 
resided in Black Lake, the aboriginal community to which he belonged 
and in which his criminal charges arose. The Court held that although 
the trial was conducted in Prince Albert, there had been no infringement 
of Mr. Yooya's constitutional rights and a fair trial was still possible. 
This was due to the fact that the procedure through which the jury panel 
was selected was done according to the Saskatchewan Juries Act21 and 
nothing in that Act operated in such a manner as to offend the Charter. 
The Court cited Justice L'Heureux-Dube in R. v. Sherrat as saying: 
the perceived importance of the jury and the Charter right to jury trial 
is meaningless without some guarantee that it will perform its duties 
impartially and represent, as far as is possible and appropriate in the 
circumstances, the larger community. Indeed, without the two charac-
teristics of impartiality and representativeness, a jury would be unable 
to perform many of the functions that make its assistance desirable in 
the first place. 22 
On the other hand, the Court in essence qualified this statement with a 
quote from Regina v. Nepoose, in which Justice McFayden of the 
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench stated: 
18 Charter, supra note 11 at ss. 11 (f) and 15. 
19 See e.g. Juries Act, R.S.N.S. 1988 c. 16 and other provincial Juries Acts which legislate the 
means through which the random selection of jurors from the community should take place. 
20 (1994), 126 Sask. R. l; [1995] 2 W.W.R. 35 (Sask. Q.B.) [Yooya]. 
21 R.S.S. (1981) c. J-4. 
22 [1991] 1 S.C.R. 509 at 525, cited in Yooya, supra note 20. 
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Canadian courts have consistently held that juries need not be selected 
from any specific community, any specific race, nationality or other 
identifiable minority, and that the right to trial by jury includes the 
right to be tried by a jury selected at random from persons representing 
a cross-section of the community. While participation from minority 
groups must continue to be encouraged and facilitated, no accused is 
entitle [sic] to trial by a jury selected on the basis of racial consider-
ations which would result in the elimination of the general population 
from the jury panel. 23 
It is clear then that in Canada at least, the goal is to have a jury which is 
randomly selected from the public at large. As long as there is equal 
opportunity to sit on the jury, the goal of representative juries will be 
deemed to have been achieved. Given the fact that the administration of 
justice is left to the provinces,24 there is, at a minimum, a guarantee that 
the jury will be drawn from within the region. Beyond that, it would 
seem that the courts are largely satisfied that although juries may not 
always reflect a true cross-section of the accused's socio-economic 
group, provincial jury selection legislation guarantees a jury system in 
which a fair and legitimate verdict should be attainable. Indeed, a jury 
comprised solely of an accused's peers could have an equally de-
legitimizing effect. As Mr. Justice Strach put it in R. v. A.F. 25 
A jury's power rests in the capacity of individuals with diverse view-
points to reach a common decision that can be accepted as the 
community's verdict and will carry weight with a diverse community. 
A jury representing the broad spectrum of society is a jury whose 
independence and impartiality need not be suspect, and whose legiti-
macy is thus protected .... If a jury is weighted to reflect the values of a 
particular group - be it only of the accused or of both the accused and 
the victim - its impartiality and, hence, legitimacy will be questioned. 
A jwy drawn on parochial lines cannot meet the necessary test of 
expressing the conscience of the community. 
It would seem that despite the existence in Canada of case law 
challenging the jury selection process,26 on the whole it is perceived as 
13 (1991), 85 Alta. L.R. (2d) 18 (Q.B.) cited in Yooya, supra note 20. 
14 Constitution Act, 1867 (U .K. ), 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5 at 
s. 92. 
25 (1994), 22 C.R.R. (2d) 82; 30 C.R. (4th) 333 (Ont. Gen. Div.) [emphasis added]. 
26 See also Carter et al v. Jury Commission of Greene County et al (1969), 396 U.S. 320, 90 S. 
Ct. 518 where a group of black citizens launched a class action law suit against the Jury 
Commission alleging that the exercise of discretion by jury commissioners led to systemic 
exclusion of black jurors. 
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rendering fair outcomes most of the time while allowing for popular 
paiiicipation in the process. Given the fact that a jury verdict which is 
patently unreasonable may be appealed and even ove1iumed if it is 
inconsistent with the evidence, it is likely that jury trials are well suited 
to countries such as the United States and Canada. The Canadian courts 
have undertaken to achieve a balance between a jury system seen by the 
public as legitimately addressing the need for social representation on 
the one hand, and a system which is administratively efficient on the 
other. 
iii. Jury Nulltfication 
A final concern with the jury system in common law jurisdictions is the 
limited trend of jury nullification. It is arguable that jury nullification is 
the ultimate indicator that the jury is a truly democratic institution in that 
it allows members of the public to protest an unfair law by refusing to 
enforce it. At the same time, it is also arguable that jmy nullification is 
anti-democratic in that it represents a disregard for democratically en-
acted laws and deprives the public of its right that laws be knowable in 
advance. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has had to deal with jmy nullification 
on a number of occasions. In R. v. Morgentaler, the comi characterized 
the power of a jury to nullify as "the citizen's ultimate protection against 
oppressive laws and the oppressive enforcement of the law."27 At the 
same time however, the Comi warned that "recognizing this reality [that 
a jury may nullify] is a far cry from suggesting that counsel may 
encourage a jury to ignore a law they do not suppo1i or tell a jury that it 
has a right to do so."28 In R. v. Latimer, the defence argued that an 
accused person has a right to a jury with the power to nullify. The 
Supreme Court rejected this argument stating explicitly that the right to 
a fair trial guaranteed by section 7 of the Charter does not encompass 
such an entitlement.29 On the contrary, the Court argued, trial judges 
27 (1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 at 78-79 [Morgentaler]. 
28 Ibid., cited in R. v. Latimer, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 at 32. 
29 Ibid. at 35. 
LAY PARTICIPATION ... 43 
should attempt to instruct the jury in such a manner as to ensure that the 
jury applies the law properly and that jury nullification does not occur.30 
A problem with jury nullification in the context of post-conflict 
states with weakened legal institutions is that it could be used not as a 
protest against laws which are unfair but as a way of circumventing the 
applicability of the law to certain classes of people. This problem has 
been encountered in parts of the United States for example where all 
white juries have refused to convict white men accused of violent crimes 
against black victims.31 In Canada, Supreme Court adjudication would 
suggest that the courts will not allow jury nullification to become a 
widespread enough phenomenon to cause concerns that criminal justice 
institutions are becoming anarchic. Indeed, this is an example of how a 
state with strong legal institutions can support a jury system where the 
lay participants ultimately reach their conclusions independently and 
without direct participation by the judge in the deliberation process. 
3. Conclusion 
The jury system works in Canada, despite its problems. The effective-
ness of jury trials can be explained in two main ways. First of all, the 
adversarial process and underlying common law system complement 
the use of juries in such a manner as to make it a desirable fonn of lay 
participation. Secondly, the Canadian institutional framework is able to 
support the jury despite its shortcomings. However, an examination of 
the lay assessor system in France will demonstrate that it is likely the 
system best suited to the needs of emerging democracies and post-
conflict states. 
30 Ibid at 35. See also, R. v. Shipley (1784), 4 Doug. 73, 99 E.R. 774 (K.B.), at 824, cited with 
approval by Dickson C.J. in Morgenta/er, supra note 28 at 78. 
31 "Black Juries", supra note 12 at 540. 
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HI. THE CIVILIAN SYSTEM: 
LAY ASSESSORS IN FRANCE 
1. A Brief History 
The jury in France made its first appearance as a result of a vote by the 
Revolutionary Assembly in September of 1791.32 Before that time, 
criminal justice adjudication occurred in secret with routine use of 
torture and other oppressive means to ensure convictions.33 In fact, all 
over continental Europe, with the fall of autocratic monarchies and the 
transition to constitutional monarchies there was a tendency to adopt the 
common law style jury in criminal matters as a reflection of the political 
change and a symbol of democratic values.34 In France, therefore, the 
adoption of the jury system was more a product of political achievement 
than of judicial reform. 
However, the English-style jury never really took hold in France 
with frequent calls for its abolition starting as early as 1800.35 Ulti-
mately, most European countries including France, which had eroded 
the powers of the jury over the years, abandoned the jury because it was 
not well suited to the inquisitorial process.36 In France, this occurred 
under the Vichy Regime of 1948.37 Unlike the English situation, where 
the substantive law, including the law of evidence, evolved with the 
institution of the jury in mind, in France it was found that the jury did not 
complement the pre-existing legal system. Nonetheless, it is clear from 
the usage oflay assessors in the modem French state that the democratic 
ideal of lay pmiicipation in criminal justice was never abandoned. 
32 N.C.H. Dunbar, "The French Criminal Jury" ( 1968-70) 3 U. Tasm. L. Rev. 68 at 68 [Dunbar, 
"French Jury"]. 
33 Roderick Munday, "Jury Trial, Continental Style" (1993) 13:2 L.S. 204 at 206. 
34 Kahn, "Restore or Reform", supra note 5. 
35 Dunbar, "French Jury" , supra note 32 at 69. 
36 Kahn, "Restore or Reform", supra note 5 at 678. 
37 Kahn, "Restore or Reform", supra note 5 at 678. 
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2. Lay Assessors in the Modern French State 
Today, the use of lay assessors in criminal proceedings is governed in 
France by the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code).38 Interestingly, 
the French Constitution does not mandate trial by jury in criminal 
matters. 39 However, the Code provides at least a statutory guarantee of 
lay participation in criminal justice in the Courts d'Assize in which the 
most serious criminal offences are tried. 
Articles 254-267 lay out the procedure for the selection of lay 
assessors. These procedures resemble those set out by provincial Juries 
Acts in Canada. Article 255 stipulates that lay assessors must be citizens 
of at least 23 years of age who are able to read and right in French and 
who enjoy full political, civil, and family rights. 4° Furthermore, once an 
initial gathering of names has been generated from the electoral list, 
names are to be selected through a lottery to ensure that there is a 
reasonable element of randomness. 41 In general, as with the Canadian 
example, the statutory selection procedure provides safeguards promot-
ing a panel of assessors which represents a cross-section of society. 
Pursuant to Article 240, the Assize court is deemed to include both 
the professional and the lay assessors. Specifically, there are to be three 
judges (the President of the Court and two professional assessors)42 and 
nine lay assessors.43 Therefore, unlike the jury system where jurors are 
considered to be a separate entity from the judge, in France the Code 
calls for a collegial bench of mixed lay persons and professionals. In 
fact, both the professionals and the lay people retire together and delib-
erate as a group. 44 Furthermore, Article 359 requires only a majority of 
eight votes to convict unlike the requirement of unanimity in jury 
trials.45 The demand for eight votes ensures that a majority of the lay 
38 Code de procedure penale. in "The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes: France" trans. 
by Edward A. Tomlinson (Littleton, Colorado: Rothman, I 999) [Tomlinson]. 
39 Richard J. Terrill, "France" in World Criminal Justice Systems (Cincinnati: Anderson, 
1997). 
40 Tomlinson, supra note 38 article 255. 
41 Tomlinson, supra note 38 article 261. 
42 Tomlinson, supra note 38 articles 243 and 248(1 ). 
43 Tomlinson, supra note 38 article 296(1 ). 
44 Tomlinson, supra note 38article 355. 
45 Tomlinson, supra note 38article 359. 
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assessors are in favour of conviction without requiring a full consensus 
to be reached by the court. 
All of this is not to suggest that assessor systems will not face similar 
concerns as jury systems with the challenge of ensuring representative-
ness as was discussed in the Canadian case law in the previous section. 
However, the response to this concern is twofold: first, the assessor 
system is no more prone to this problem than the jury system and 
second, the collegial nature of the mixed bench ensures that juror biases 
are curtailed to some extent. 
3. Conclusion 
In France there is supervision both of the judiciary by lay participants 
and of lay participants by professional judges in the criminal justice 
process. In creating a mixed bench the French have ensured that judges 
cannot convict an accused without the support of the majority of lay 
participants, thereby infusing the process with an important participa-
tory democratic element. Additionally, lay assessors cannot convict an 
accused without having to explain themselves to some extent to the 
judge. This can serve to guard against emotionally driven verdicts by 
juries. In other words, the French system would seem to be conducive to 
achieving a balance between democratic involvement in criminal justice 
on the one hand, and judicial control over lay participants on the other. 
It is for this reason that the use of lay assessors is likely better suited 
to the needs of post-conflict, fractionalized societies than is the jury 
system. Lay participation ensures that judges are kept in touch with the 
social reality beyond their otherwise privileged existence. This is par-
ticularly important in post-conflict societies where the social divide 
tends to be far greater than it does in more institutionalized democracies. 
On the other hand, keeping the assessors at ann's length ensures that the 
element of accountability for decision-making tactics remains integral 
to the process. 
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IV. CASE STUDY: 
LAY PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN 
POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 
1. The Context of the Transition to Participatory Democracy 
Both during and after apartheid, South Africa was one of the most 
deeply fractionalized societies imaginable. The division of society 
along racial lines perpetuated this fractionalization into the post-apart-
heid era. Despite the existence of strong institutions in South Africa 
during apartheid, the need for institutional reform in that country was as 
great as in any post-conflict state. In fact, the strength of the bureau-
cratic infrastructure during apartheid resulted in widespread distrust of 
institutions by most citizens. The courts, in particular, were viewed as 
"willing and obedient servants of a repressive legislature rather than 
impartial and objective arbiters and dispensers of justice, stepping in to 
protect the individual citizen from legislative and executive excesses."46 
Of particular note is the fact that the jury system was abolished in South 
Africa in 196947 and there was therefore no lay participation possible, 
with the exception of very limited use of assessors which will be 
discussed below. 
During the period leading up to the transition to full participatory 
democracy, a great deal oflegal academic work went into drafting a new 
constitution with a judiciable bill of rights.48 The Constitution which 
eventually emerged from these discussions has been championed as a 
model for any emerging democracy. However, it would seem that far 
less academic thought went into how to reform many of the institutions 
which would ultimately be charged with the task of putting the theory 
behind the new Constitution into practice. 
A particular challenge was that the pre-apartheid judiciary was to 
remain in place when the new regime took power.49 Therefore, the 
46 M.G. Cowling, "Judges and the Protection of Human Rights in South Africa: Articulating 
the Inarticulate Premise" (1987) 3 S.A.J.H.R. 177 at 181. 
47Niel Vidmar, "Juries and Lay Assessors in the Commonwealth of Nations: A Contemporary 
Survey'', online: Duke Law <www.law.duke.edu/fac/vidmar/juriesandlay.pdt> [Vidmar, "Ju-
ries"]. 
48 Huebner, "Who Decides", supra note 13 at 961. 
49 Huebner, "Who Decides", supra note 13 at 962. 
48 - DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
enforcers of apartheid who were largely responsible for the distrust of 
legal institutions in the first place, were to participate in a new legal 
order which it was hoped would ultimately be seen as legitimate by the 
public at large. 
No doubt, the new Constitution was a step in the right direction. 
Modeled in part after the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 has a section devoted 
to the rights of accused persons: 
35 (3) Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes 
the right 
a. to be informed of the charge with sufficient detail to answer it; 
b. to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence; 
c. to a public trial before an ordinary court; 
d. to have their trial begin and conclude without unreasonable delay; 
e. to be present when being tried; 
f. to choose, and be represented by a legal practitioner and to be 
informed of this right promptly; 
g. to have a legal practitioner assigned to the accused person by the 
state and at state expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise 
result, and to be informed of this right promptly; 
h. to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during 
the proceedings; 
1. to adduce and challenge evidence; 
J. not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence; 
k. to be tried in a language that the accused person understands or, if 
that is not practicable, to have the proceedings interpreted in that 
language; 
I. not to be convicted for an act or omission that was not an offence 
under either national or international law at the time it was 
committed or omitted; 
m. not to be tried for an offence in respect of an act or omission for 
which that person has previously been either convicted or 
acquitted; 
n. to the benefit of the least severe of the prescribed punishments if 
the prescribed punishment for the offence has been changed 
between the time that the offence was committed and the time of 
sentencing; and of appeal to, or review by, a higher court. 50 
5° Constitution of the Republic of South Afhca 1996, No. I 08 of 1996. 
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The rights guaranteed by this Constitutional document are in many ways 
reminiscent of the rights encompassed by the Canadian Charter. How-
ever, the right to be tried by a tribunal with lay paiiicipants is conspicu-
ously absent. This is likely due to a recognition by the Constitution's 
framers that the jury system had been largely unsuccessful in South 
African history. However, it is unfortunate that an alternative form of 
lay participation was not contemplated at that time. 
2. A Brief History of the Jury in South Africa 
The jury was first introduced in South Africa in 1828. 51 However, as in 
France, the system never gained widespread acceptance and by 19 I 0, 
statutory reforms were beginning to limit the use of juries. 52 By I 917, 
the accused could elect to be tried by a judge alone due to the fact that 
the all-white juries were proving unable to render verdicts which were 
fair to blacks accused of criminal offences. 53 In 1969, juries were being 
used in less than 1 % of cases and the jury system was ultimately 
abolished by the Abolition of Juries Act 34 of that year. 54 
During the period leading up to the transition to participatory de-
mocracy, what little discourse there was about legal institutional reform 
was largely opposed to the reintroduction of the jury system to South 
Africa. 55 Michael Huebner identifies three major concerns militating 
against the implementation of a jury system in South Africa: 
(i) the lack of support for it in the South African legal community; (ii) 
the dysfunctions often associated with juries in highly fractionalized 
societies; and (iii) the staggering administrative costs that the system 
would entail. 56 
Indeed, as one prominent South African legal commentator, Nico 
Steyler, put it: 
The export of the jury system to English-speaking Africa has not met 
with success. It has been argued that the jury system, which implies 
51 J.A. Chubb, "The Jury System" (1956) 73 S.A.L.J. 194. 
52 Ibid at 199. 
53 Ibid at 199. 
54 Huebner, "Who Decides", supra note 13 at 972. 
55 Huebner, "Who Decides", supra note 13 at 971. 
56 Huebner, "Who Decides", supra note 13 at 970. 
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autonomous decision-making by the jurors, can function properly only 
where the community in which it operates is socially homogeneous 
with no major racial, cultural, or religious divisions. In African coun-
tries where such divisions exist, kinship and group loyalties often 
overrule fair application of the criminal law.57 
However, as was previously discussed, the jury has been able to endure 
in ethnically diverse societies such as Canada and the United States. 
One potential explanation for this is that Canada and the United States 
are largely harmonious societies and have not experienced the same 
degree of fractionalization as South Africa. 
Racism continues to be a real problem in North America; however, 
the jury system and legal institutions more generally are able to accom-
modate these concerns to some extent. This may be due in part to the 
fact that ideas such as judicial independence and impartiality are more 
widely accepted by the public as bringing legitimacy to the system. 
Nonetheless, Steyler concludes by saying: 
in our divided society, participatory democracy in general, and lay 
participation in criminal justice in particular, may serve sectarian 
interests rather than that of the whole community ... The group loyal-
ties of lay members of courts may stand in the way of rational fact 
finding. 58 
The skepticism about the suitability of a jury system in South Africa 
was more than mere conjecture. In Ghana, for example, it was argued 
that juries were not appropriate following the transition to democracy: 
The gaining of independence has not led to any extension of trial by 
jury in spite of the eager adoption of the other marks of a modern 
democratic state. This may be interpreted ... as further evidence of the 
unsuitability of jury trial in present African conditions. 59 
Huebner' s first two concerns were, therefore, clearly widespread. His 
third concern, that the cost of implementing a jury system would be 
staggering, arose out of the reality of linguistic pluralism in South 
Africa. The need for and cost of translation services would be astound-
57 Nico Steyler, "Democratising Criminal Justice" (Paper presented at conference: A new 
Jurisprudence for a future South Africa, U Pretoria October 1989) at 23 [Steyler, 
"Democratising"], cited in Heubner, "Who Decides", supra note 13 at 972. 
58 Ibid. at 29. 
59 J.H. Jearsy, "Trial by Jury and Trial with the Aid of Assessors in the Superior Courts of 
British African Territories: I" (1960) 4 J. Afr. L. 133 at 143. 
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ing. However, he notes that the main concern with the administrative 
costs is tied to his belief that the jury system is not appropriate for South 
Africa. In other words, Huebner argues, if it was demonstrated that 
introduction of the jury system was the ideal way to bring public 
confidence to the justice system it might be justifiable. However, given 
the near unanimous opposition to reintroducing the jury system into 
South Africa, the cost cannot be justified.60 
Having demonstrated that the jury system would be unlikely to solve 
the problems with lack of public confidence in the criminal justice 
system, it is necessary to look at whether the use of lay assessors might 
overcome the sh01icomings of the jury system while maintaining the 
needed element of democratic participation. 
There is currently only limited use of lay assessors in South Africa. 
In fact, as of 2001, the use of lay assessors was only mandatory in cases 
involving murder, rape, robbery, assault and indecent assault although it 
remained optional for a wider range of criminal offences. 61 This is 
indicative of the fact that South Africa has not undergone the extent of 
institutional refonn of criminal justice that is arguably needed if the 
system is to enjoy any real legitimacy in the long tenn. In fact, the use of 
lay assessors is scarcely more widespread than it was before the political 
transition. 
The Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 granted judicial discretion to 
judges of the Supreme Court, the highest level in the hierarchy of comis 
of first instance, to summon one to two assessors to paiiicipate in the 
proceedings. The use of lay assessors was only legally required in trials 
in which the judge saw the imposition of the death penalty as a potential 
sentence.62 However, less than 10% of criminal cases are heard at the 
Supreme Court level. The majority are heard by magistrates in the lower 
courts where the use of assessors was only possible with the permission 
of the Minister of Justice before apartheid, which resulted in its virtual 
disuse. 63 Fmiherrnore, the system for the selection of lay assessors did 
nothing to bring participation in criminal justice to "the people." On the 
contrary, assessors were virtual professionals, who usually had prior 
60 Heubner, "Who Deeides", supra note 13 at 975. 
61 Vidmar, "Juries", supra note 47 at 13. 
62 Heubner, "Who Decides", supra note 13 at 976. 
63 Huebner, "Who Decides", supra note 13 at 976. 
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legal training and who were usually friends of the justices who re-
quested their assistance. 64 
If the purpose of employing lay assessors in the criminal justice 
system is to inject an element of democracy into the process in order to 
legitimize it, the pre-apartheid scheme in South Africa was clearly 
unable to achieve this goal. A 1984 study undertaken to determine the 
actual operation of the assessor system came to the following conclu-
sion: "It is clear from the interview that the judges were very rarely 
outvoted by their assessors when it came to public pronouncement on 
guilt or innocence, or on the existence or absence of extenuating circum-
stances."65 Therefore, as Steyler noted: "where assessors are limited to 
an advisory role and unrepresentative of the community, they represent 
an exercise in sham democracy."66 
Huebner makes a series of recommendations for reforming the 
assessor system to better suit the needs of the post-transitional criminal 
justice institutions. He sees the use of assessors primarily as a means of 
training black lawyers for careers as judges.67 In effect then, what 
Huebner advocates is not really lay participation but rather broader 
participation by a more diverse sector of the legal community. In other 
words, he sees the use of assessors as a short term tool for the achieve-
ment of greater ethnic diversity in the judiciary. However, if this is the 
sole reason for implementing an assessor scheme, the longer term goal 
of achieving a legitimate criminal justice system through lay participa-
tion will remain elusive. 
The limited use of lay assessors at present in South Africa is a step in 
the right direction. However, in order to infuse the system with the 
needed element of democratic participation, the use of lay assessors 
must be greatly expanded. Indeed, it should be mandatory, or at least 
available at the option of the accused, at all criminal trials. Furthermore, 
the selection process must ensure an element of randomness in order to 
promote better representativeness. Amendments to the South African 
Magistrates' Act in 1998 took some of the initial steps towards reform. 
64 Huebner, "Who Decides", supra note 13 at 978 
65 Huebner, "Who Decides", supra note 13 at 978. 
66 Steyler, "Democratising", supra note 57, cited in Huebner, "Who Decides", supra note 13 at 
980. 
67 Huebner, "Who Decides", supra note 13 at 985. 
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In particular, Clause I amended section 34 of the old Act to remove the 
requirement that assessors have "skill and experience in the matter to 
which the action relates,"68 which would seem to suggest a move away 
from more professional assessors to true laity in public participation. 
Clause 2 amended the old s. 93 by providing that assessors may be 
summoned in any matter, expanding somewhat the scope of offences in 
which assessors may be used. However, the perpetuation of a system in 
which the use of assessors is at the option of Magistrates is insufficient 
to effectively promote true lay participation in South Africa. 
3. Conclusion 
Unfortunately, it is too soon to tell what effect lay participation is having 
on public confidence in criminal justice institutions. This is due in part 
to the fact that its use is not sufficiently widespread. Criminal activity is 
on the rise in South Africa which suggests that the system is currently 
failing to meet the needs of the South African people. A decade after the 
transition to participatory democracy, South African legal institutions 
are in need of further reform. Incorporation of widespread lay participa-
tion in criminal proceedings would bring popular legitimacy to criminal 
justice institutions which they have likely never fully enjoyed. 
V. AN EXTREME FORM OF LAY PARTICIPATION: 
GACACA TRIALS IN RWANDA 
1. A Brief History of the Conflict and of Resulting Criminal 
Justice Concerns 
Rwanda offers a tragic example of a country faced with significant 
challenges in the aftennath of a devastating conflict. It is estimated that 
the 1994 genocide claimed the lives of up to I million Rwandans in 
fewer than three months. Most of these victims belonged to the Tutsi 
68 833-1998, Magistrates' Courts Amendment Act, 1998. 
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minority ethnic group. 69 Another two million took refuge in 
neighbouring countries.70 In the aftermath of the genocide, a new gov-
ernment - comprised largely of Tutsis who had been in exile since 
before the genocide - took power in Rwanda. They inherited a state in 
which virtually no functioning institutions existed. Yet, in order to 
rebuild the country, the government was forced to rely upon those 
institutions which remained despite their weakened state. 
The civilian-style criminal justice system in particular, was plagued 
with the dual function of maintaining or inducing social order in a 
fractionalized society and bringing the perpetrators of the genocide to 
justice. This proved to be an impossible task under the existing infra-
structure.71 Ultimately, the United Nations instituted the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), an ad hoc tribunal to assist in 
bringing justice to the people of Rwanda and ending the cycle of 
impunity.72 However, domestic prosecution remained a national priority 
in order to ensure that perpetrators who did not fall within the jurisdic-
tion of ICTR were brought to justice. 
A problem arose with the government's commitment to continuing 
with local prosecutions in that legal institutions were virtually non-
existent after the genocide. In fact, the Government of Rwanda provided 
the following statistics on the extent to which legal infrastructures had 
been damaged: of 750 judges in early 1994, 244 remained after the 
genocide; out of eighty-seven prosecutors, fourteen remained; out of 
193 Inspector Police Judiciaries (investigators), thirty survived; out of 
214 court clerks, only fifty-nine remained. 73 The Government of 
Rwanda further estimates that, given the lack of prosecutors, judges, and 
lawyers, it would take the conventional court system over 200 years to 
deliver justice.74 
69 Ulvin, Peter, "The Introduction of a Modernized Gacaca for Judging Suspects of Participa-
tion in the Genocide and the Massacres of I 994 in Rwanda" (Paper presented to the Belgian 
Secretary of State for Development Cooperation) at 2 [unpublished, online: The Minnesota-
Stanford-Wisconsin MacArthur Consortium on Peace and International Cooperation <http:// 
macconsortium.org/ITV/200 I /Uvin.gacaca.report.htm>] [Ulvin, "Modernized Gacaca"]. 
70 Mburu, "Challenges", supra note I at 4. 
71 Mburu, "Challenges", supra note I at 2. 
72 Official Website of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, online: <http:// 
www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/geninfo/relevance.html> 
73 Mburu, "Challenges", supra note 1 at 11. 
74 Official Government of Rwanda Website at "genocide" link, online: <http:// 
www.rwandal.com> [Official Government of Rwanda Website]. 
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In order to deal with the problem, the government, with the assis-
tance of the international community, established a number of intensive 
training programs aimed at establishing a core of trained legal personnel 
who could undertake the daunting task of rebuilding the judicial sys-
tem. 75 In the meantime, thousands of genocide suspects sat in prison, 
with no prospects for a trial in the near future. In fact, by the end of 2000, 
there were over 130,000 prisoners being held in facilities which could 
not accommodate such numbers.76 Furthermore, most of the efforts at 
rebuilding were geared towards government-oriented infrastructure, 
such as the prosecution service and the judiciary. At this stage, however, 
little effort was put into providing genocide suspects with defence 
counsel.77 
In light of the fundamental inability of the formal justice system to 
deal with the detainees, it was determined that a creative solution was 
necessaiy. If legal institutions were to have any hope of rebuilding in 
any sustainable way, it would be necessary to relieve them of as much of 
the burden of dealing with genocide suspects as possible. Structural 
expediency had occurred to some extent in the early aftermath of the 
genocide through the creation of temporary legal structures known as 
commissions de triage which undertook to quickly process genocide 
cases.78 It was not long, however, before it became clear that the com-
missioners simply lacked the legal training to conduct trials in such a 
manner as to ensure even minimal legitimacy and the project was 
abandoned. Furthermore, the lack of any lay participation in the process 
no doubt further undermined the legitimacy of the process since it was 
completely detached from the people of Rwanda. 
2. The Establishment of the Gacaca Courts 
In response to concerns that the domestic prosecution of war criminals 
was failing to address both the need for impunity of genocide perpetra-
tors and national reconciliation, the Government decided to reintroduce 
75 Mburu, "Challenges", supra note I at 12. 
76 Troubled Course, infra note 88 at I. 
77 Mburu, "Challenges", supra note I at 13. 
78 Mburu, "Challenges", supra note I at 12. 
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a traditional community-based justice system known as the gacaca.79 
This fonn of traditional justice was typically reserved for conflict reso-
lution within small communities, particularly with respect to property 
disputes; however, it was felt that it could be transformed to suit the 
needs of the grossly overburdened criminal justice system. According to 
Peter Ulvin, a consultant for the Belgian government, the aim of the 
gacaca is twofold: (i) speeding up the trials and emptying the prisons; 
and (ii) involving the community, including the victims, in establishing 
the truth and through that truth, promoting reconciliation. 80 
i. The structure and fimction of the gacaca courts 
The gacaca tribunals have been created throughout the country and will 
allow for public participation, even at the most local level. Indeed, the 
plan is that over 200,000 people will participate in more than 10,000 
gacaca tribunals. 81 The government has created a hierarchy of genocide 
offences as well as a hierarchy of courts: 
CATEGORY GENOCIDE OFFENCES 
1 (i) persons whose criminal acts or acts of par-
ticipation place them among the planners, 
organizers, instigators, supervisors and 
leaders of the crime of genocide or any 
other crime against humanity 
(ii) persons who acted in positions of authority 
at the National, Prefectorial, Communal, 
Sector or Cell level, or in a political party, 
army, religious organizations or militia and 
who perpetrated or fostered such crimes 
(iii) notorious murderers who through particu-
lar zeal distinguished themselves in cer-
tain areas. 
79 Ulvin, "Modernized Gacaca", supra note 69 at 3. 
so Ulvin, "Modernized Gacaca", supra note 69 at 3. 
81 Ulvin, "Modernized Gacaca", supra note 69 at 3. 
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CATEGORY GENOCIDE OFFENCES GA CA CA 
JURISDICTION 
2 persons whose criminal acts place them among Commune 
the perpetrators, conspirators or accomplices Level 
of intentional homicide or of serious assault 
[sic] against the person - causing death 
3 persons whose acts make them guilt [sic] of Secteur Level 
other serious assaults against the person of 
another 
4 persons who committed crimes against Cellule Level 
property 
Appeals hearing and passing judgment of appeals from Prefecture 
the lower gacaca courts 
Hierarchy of Offences and Jurisdiction of gacaca tribunals82 
Therefore, even at the level of small rural communities (Cellule Level), 
there will be an opportunity for public participation in the trials. Every 
level of court has a general assembly which is present before the 
tribunal, participates in discussing the acts (providing testimony and 
counter-testimony), and which contributes to the making of arguments 
in favour or against findings of guilt. The members of the general 
assembly at the Celfule Level are further responsible for compiling lists 
of those who were victims of the genocide including victims of rape and 
of those who participated in the crimes. They must also compile lists of 
those who moved away from their usual residences during the geno-
cide. 83 The general assembly offers strong inducements towards confes-
sion through significant reductions in penalties.84 This is likely the result 
of the belief that confession best ensures truth and thus reconciliation. 
At the Cellule Level, the general assembly is made up of all inhabitants 
of the Cellule who are over 18 years of age. At the higher levels in the 
82 Official Government of Rwanda Website, supra note 74. 
83 Official Government of R1va11da Website, supra note 74. 
84 Official Government of Rwanda Website, supra note 74. 
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court hierarchy, the members of the general assembly are comprised of 
representatives from lower levels. 85 
The judges of the gacaca court council itself must be "respectable 
people of at least 21 years of age and elected by people of voting age" 
from within the general assembly. All members of the gacaca at all 
levels are lay people. There are no professionals involved in the process 
with the exception of members of the Coordination Committee which is 
due to be set up by the Ministry of Justice in con-oboration with the High 
Court to monitor the progress of the gacaca courts and to ensure that the 
proceedings are undertaken in a fair and equitable manner.86 
To a foreign observer, in particular a foreign observer from a state 
with strong legal institutions, there are immediate concerns about the 
legitimacy of the gacaca process. Indeed, the gacaca system subverts 
several fundamental principles of democratic justice agreed upon 
through international human rights instruments such as the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights. There is a lack of separation between the 
adjudicators and the prosecution, no defence counsel, strong pressures 
to self-incriminate, no legally reasoned verdicts, and no nationally 
agreed upon punishment - which could result in vast regional differ-
ences in sentencing. 87 As a result, many human rights observers have 
been skeptical of the gacaca process.88 However, such analysis must not 
be undertaken in a vacuum. Indeed, as Peter Ulvin argues, some 
compromise is inevitable due in part to the fact that international stan-
dards of criminal law "were not designed to deal with the challenges 
faced when massive numbers of people victims and perpetrators of 
crimes - have to live together again, side by side."89 
It is important, therefore, when assessing the gacaca system, to bear 
in mind the alternative. While the formal justice system may appear on 
85 Official Government of Rwanda Website, supra note 74. 
86 Official Government of Rwanda Website, supra note 74. 
87 Ulvin, "Modernized Gacaca", supra note 69. 
88 See e.g. Amnesty International, News Release "Rwanda: The Troubled Course of Justice" 
(26 April 2000) online: Amnesty International <http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/ 
AFR470152000?0penDocument&of=COUNTRIES\RWANDA> [Troubled Course]. In this 
report, it is argued that the gacaca courts will not fall within the acceptable range of 
international human rights standards without the safeguards of institutionalized justice sys-
tems, such as provision of defence counsel. 
89 Ulvin, "Modernized Gacaca", supra note 69 at 4. 
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its face to be an institution that is more capable of respecting human 
rights norms, the reality is quite different. In fact, the formal system has 
proven unable to guarantee the right to a trial within a reasonable time 
(at present, some of the accused have been incarcerated for almost a 
decade without a trial). The conditions are abhorrent by international 
standards as the prison population is almost double that which can be 
reasonably accommodated.9° Furthermore, less than forty percent of 
those brought to justice through the formal system had access to defence 
counsel and the quality of the prosecutors, investigators, and judges was 
minimal at best.91 
While prosecution by ICTR does guarantee respect for the rights of 
the accused, it is incapable of processing large numbers of people. 
Furthermore, ICTR is greatly removed from the Rwandan people. Not 
only is the tribunal itself located in Arusha, Tanzania, but with no lay 
participation, it is likely that most Rwandans have little knowledge of 
the prosecutions undertaken by the tribunal. 
Ulvin argues that while the gacaca procedure may not appear con-
ducive to the respect of international norms of criminal justice, it may be 
so indirectly. For example, while there is no defence counsel or formal 
prosecutor, the back and forth dialogue among members of the general 
assembly may actually amount to the equivalent of a full and fair 
defence.92 Furthennore, the members of the general assembly have first 
hand knowledge of the events and are perhaps more likely to come up 
with a realistic picture of what actually happened than a dossier as-
sembled by bureaucrats in Kigali. It is worth noting as well that the 
prisoners and their families seem to support the gacaca,93 which sug-
gests that they see it as a superior system to the one that has been failing 
them thus far. According to a 2001 United Nations Study, piiot gacaca 
courts acquitted in approximately 1/3 of cases and emphasized incorpo-
rating community public works service in sentencing instead of further 
prison time. 94 These numbers are promising in that they do not indicate a 
propensity towards conviction in all cases. 
" 0 Troubled Course, supra note 88 at 11. 
91 Ulvin, "Modernized Gacaca", supra note 69 at 4. 
92 Ulvin, "Modernized Gacaca", supra note 69 at 5. 
93 Ulvin, "Modernized Gacaca", supra note 69 at 6. 
Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations 
Population Fund, "Second Country Cooperation Framework for Rwanda (2002-2006)" (200 l) 
at 3, online: <www.undp.org/execbrd/pdf/rwaccf2.PDF>. 
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In many respects, the gacaca courts resemble pre-17th century 
juries at common law. It is arguable, in fact, that the lack of infrastruc-
ture in Rwanda, both institutionally and in tenns of transportation and 
communications, has resulted in a system with needs similar to those 
faced by early common law courts. Early common law juries were felt to 
be capable of delivering justice and there is no reason why the gacaca 
courts should be any different. 
3. Conclusion 
The gacaca courts have been instituted as a means of achieving transi-
tional justice. In other words, once the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide 
have been dealt with, the role of the gacaca courts will have become 
obsolete. However, it might be in the best interest of the people of 
Rwanda for the government to consider a similar system in the longer 
term. Widespread corruption in what remains of the formal justice 
system, as well as a general lack of confidence in severely weakened 
government institutions, has created fertile soil for widespread reform. 
Indeed, whether the civil-style court structure is rebuilt or an en-
tirely new criminal justice system is instituted, lay participation will be 
the key to its success. Particularly in the aftermath of significant public 
participation in the gacaca trials, as the new Rwandan democracy is 
built and institutions are strengthened, the government should continue 
to promote lay pariicipation at all levels in order to ensure the sustain-
able legitimacy of criminal justice in Rwanda. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Institutional reform must be a priority of emerging democracies and 
post-conflict states. In particular, legal institutions must be reformed 
with a view to increasing lay pariicipation in criminal justice processes. 
Effective promotion of the Rule of Law will only be attainable when 
institutions are seen as legitimate by the people. This will be most 
possible if democratic values at a macro-political level infuse every 
level of government. In particular, the use of juries or lay assessors in 
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criminal justice systems allows for democratic participation at one of 
the most potentially hostile intersections between the individual and the 
State - where the individual's liberty is at stake through the potential 
application of criminal sanctions. It has been argued that in deeply 
fractionalized societies, lay assessors are likely best suited for the 
fulfillment of the need for lay participation. 
South Africa has acknowledged this need only to a limited extent. 
Academic literature seems to recognize the need for lay participation 
and yet this has not been put into effective practice in criminal justice 
adjudication in South Africa at present. South Africa remains a deeply 
fractionalized society which could benefit from increased democratic 
participation. 
Rwanda, on the other hand, is best described as remaining in a state 
of transition. The gacaca courts represent a creative means of dealing 
with the overburdened criminal justice system. With any luck, the 
lesson learned from the gacaca trials will be that including the public in 
such impmiant proceedings helps bring legitimacy to legal institutions 
and thus forwards the adoption of democratic values. 
A sad reality of the state of world affairs is that the trend towards 
democratization through conflict is far from over. The number of states 
actively involved in attempts to rebuild and strengthen institutions in the 
name of sustainable democracy is significant. The importance of demo-
cratic participation at all levels, therefore, must not only be promoted, it 
is a value upon which the legal system must insist. 
